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Inference to the Best Explanation and the Importance of Peculiarly Explanatory Virtues 
Abstract 
Inference to the best explanation has at times appeared almost indistinguishable from a 
rule that recommends simply that we should infer the hypothesis which is most plausible 
given available evidence. In this paper I argue that avoiding this collapse requires the 
identification of peculiarly explanatory virtues and consider Woodward‟s concept of 
invariance as an example of such a virtue. An additional benefit of augmenting IBE with 
Woodward‟s model of causal explanation is also suggested. 
  
Manuscript
1. Inference to the Best Explanation and the Threat of Vacuity 
To illustrate the advantage of „inference to the best explanation‟ (henceforth, IBE) over 
enumerative induction, Harman (1965, 90-1) invites us to consider inferences from 
samples to populations and the question of “when a person is and when he is not 
warranted in making the inference from “All observed A‟s are B‟s” to “All A‟s are B‟s””. 
Harman continues: 
 The answer is that one is warranted in making this inference whenever the 
 hypothesis that all A‟s are B‟s is (in the light of all the evidence) a better, simpler, 
 more plausible (and so forth) hypothesis than is the hypothesis, say, that someone 
 is biasing the observed sample in order to make us think that all A‟s are B‟s.  
Clearly we can posit various reasons for why all the observed A‟s were also B‟s. It might 
be that “All A‟s are B‟s”; someone could have purposefully manipulated the sample to 
deceive us; perhaps our method for selecting subjects ensures, or makes it likely that, we 
will observe only those A‟s that are also B‟s, and so on. Furthermore, and equally 
patently, the actual reason for the observed regularity will be different in different cases. 
We observe only male drones, because all drones are male. Water that‟s pumped through 
an effective filter will contain no contaminants above a certain size; the absence of 
contaminants from the original water supply, however, often will not be the reason that 
the filtered water is pure. Harman supposes that such reasons can function as 
explanations. Let‟s concede that for now. Faced with competing explanations for an 
observed regularity Harman urges us to infer to the truth (or approximate truth) of 
whichever explanation is best. 
Harman‟s proposal is thoroughly sensible – we should infer that hypothesis which is 
“better” and “more plausible”.1 However, without some guidance concerning how we 
identify the best, from competing explanations, and Harman has named a problem but not 
solved it. Insofar as IBE is regarded as a substantive theory of confirmation, its advocates 
can‟t rest content with an interpretation that advises only to infer that conclusion which is 
most plausible. Seemingly though Harman‟s phrase is sufficiently seductive, and has 
become sufficiently well-entrenched, that it is now hard to appreciate how vacuous the 
advice really is. Had Harman suggested we infer „that hypothesis which seems most 
plausible in light of all available evidence‟, the attenuated condition of the suggestion 
would perhaps be more immediately apparent. If inferring to the best explanation is 
different, for Harman, it‟s hard to see how. On inspection, inference to the best 
explanation can appear quite insipid.  
Lipton (2004), cognizant of the problem, offers a general means of responding. 
Unfortunately his development of that response opens him to critical objections, or so I‟ll 
argue in Section 2. The problems with Lipton‟s response trace to a failure to identify 
explanatory virtues, as distinct from virtues of the hypotheses that feature in the 
explanation. This diagnosis leaves room for a successful defense of IBE that utilizes 
Lipton‟s general strategy, but insists on peculiarly explanatory virtues, burdening 
advocates for IBE with the task of identifying such. Turning to the work of Woodward 
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 Harman does, in addition, suggest that better explanations are simpler, less ad hoc, and 
explain more. However, these concepts are insufficiently well-defined to provide helpful 
guidance in the face of competing explanations. 
(for example, Woodward (2003)), I‟ll argue in Section 3 that distinctive explanatory 
virtues are apparent within the sciences and, furthermore, that it is not implausible to 
suggest that these reliably guide theory choice. Part of Woodward‟s project involves 
discriminating descriptions from explanations. An implication of this distinction is that 
Harman‟s example, above, might fall outside the scope of IBE, a possibility I discuss and 
welcome in Section 4. The purpose of the paper is not a complete defense of explanatory 
reasoning, but an attempt to motivate two important pieces of the groundwork: first, to 
urge that IBE requires the identification of explanatory virtues, and can‟t rely on the 
theoretical virtues of those hypotheses that are centrally involved in an explanation; 
second, to suggest that IBE has a limited scope, for purposes of understanding ampliative 
reasoning, which we might move some ways towards delineating by distinguishing 
descriptions from explanations. 
2. Loveliness, Likeliness, Matching, Guiding 
Concerned that IBE avoid appearing trite, Lipton responds in part by distinguishing two 
senses of „best explanation‟. The likeliest explanation, for Lipton, is that which is most 
likely to be correct. Informed that two theories each explain some phenomenon, we 
establish the likeliest explanation by evaluating which theory is best supported by 
available evidence. To infer to the likeliest explanation we needn‟t attend to anything 
about the explanations themselves; it is the well confirmedness of the respective theories 
that matters. The loveliest explanation, in contrast, can‟t be determined by attending to 
the merits of the underlying theory. Lipton suggests that the loveliest explanation 
“provides the most understanding”. White (2005), endorsing Lipton‟s distinction, 
suggests that explanations are often valued for “the degree of satisfaction” they deliver; 
explanations might disappoint because they are implausible, but also and alternatively 
because they can be “deeply unsatisfying”. Having made this conceptual distinction, 
Lipton and White each suggest that IBE is a potentially important tool for investigating 
inductive reasoning, because explanatory loveliness might prove a reliable guide to 
explanatory likeliness. If this connection between loveliness and likeliness is real, we 
could justifiably appeal to the loveliness of an explanation for purposes of defending 
conclusions about which theory or hypothesis is most plausible, at least in some 
circumstances.  
One concern with the proposal, as described, is that the concepts of understanding and 
satisfaction threaten to introduce a worryingly subjective dimension. What helps one 
person understand some phenomenon might differ from what helps another; explanations 
satisfy some folks, but not others. Judgments about differences in explanatory quality that 
ride on these kinds of consideration are unreliable markers of underlying plausibility. 
Lipton at least is careful to distance himself from overly psychological interpretations of 
the relevant concepts, but we can avoid such connotations altogether since the basic 
distinction suffices. Explanations can be evaluated in terms of the plausibility of the 
theory that motivates them, or in terms of features that are peculiar to explanations and 
independent of associated theories. In what follows I‟ll use the phrase „explanatory 
virtue‟ to denote the latter. IBE avoids the charge of triviality by distinguishing 
explanatory virtues from the overall merits of a theory, and defining the rule as an 
inference based on the former; the plausibility of the rule, at least if it‟s understood 
normatively, hinges on whether explanatory virtues reliably guide us towards a proper 
evaluation of available theories. 
In furtherance of his claim that explanatory virtues need not be subjective, Lipton 
suggests simplicity, provision of mechanisms, scope, precision, among others, as 
appropriate measures of explanatory loveliness. None are unproblematic concepts, as 
Lipton concedes. Nevertheless, attaching loveliness here helps remove any lingering 
specter of subjectivity. Barnes (1995) protests, however, that these are not reliable guides 
to underlying plausibility. Suppose we have two competing explanations, but only one 
provides a mechanism. Whether we prefer the mechanistic explanation depends on the 
independent plausibility of the mechanism, suggests Barnes, rather than any intrinsic 
value in describing mechanisms. Lipton offers no obvious means of evaluating 
mechanistic hypotheses, but providing them can‟t be a reliable means of improving an 
explanation, or choosing between competing explanations, because even contrived and 
outrageous suggestions about the underlying mechanism describe a mechanism. Barnes 
raises similar complaints against the other putative explanatory virtues that Lipton 
describes. 
Against the first edition of Lipton‟s book Barnes objections seem pertinent. Lipton (1991) 
asserts that “mechanism and precision are explanatory virtues” (118), “unification makes 
for lovely explanations” (119) and suggests that elegance and simplicity are also qualities 
of explanatory loveliness (68). He further argues that by attending to these qualities we 
are typically, reliably directed to the most plausible hypothesis. Lipton is unfortunately 
silent, however, on the issue of how we should balance the pursuit of these various 
virtues, which might pull in opposing directions. If each virtue is evaluated in isolation, 
then Barnes objections are critical: discriminating purely on the basis of the presence or 
absence of a mechanism, for example, will often warrant an implausible inference. If, on 
the other hand, Lipton intends us to weigh all explanatory virtues and reach an 
appropriate balance between them, then his failure to describe how this should be 
conducted leaves the account disconcertingly obscure. Lipton‟s earlier defense is either 
reasonably transparent, but implausible, or quite opaque. However, Lipton‟s defense 
shifts between the two editions of his book. In the more recent he argues explicitly for a 
correspondence between theoretical and explanatory virtues, then argues independently, 
and on empirical grounds, that we in fact use the latter to evaluate the former. What is 
discussed as “matching” and “guiding” in the later edition are not distinguished in the 
earlier. Lipton hereby implies that the likeliest and loveliest explanations will each 
provide the best balance of various virtues, although again Lipton provides no guidance 
on how we are to recognize the best trade-off. Given Lipton‟s new strategy it becomes 
hard to accuse him of proposing an unreliable rule of inference, since it‟s a rule that by 
definition should guide us towards that conclusion which best instantiates all those 
theoretical virtues that are typically assumed important. The problems with Lipton‟s new 
strategy lie elsewhere. 
One prominent theme in Lipton‟s book is that IBE describes our inferential practices 
better than alternative accounts. Lipton claims such advantages over Bayesianism, 
hypothetico-deductivism and Mill‟s methods of causal reasoning. Deficiencies with each, 
in terms of how well they describe our inferential practices, suggest either their 
replacement with IBE or, in the case of Bayesianism, augmentation with explanatory 
considerations. These comparative claims have been challenged. Rappaport (1996) 
defends Mill‟s methods against Lipton‟s concerns. Bird (2007) argues that Lipton‟s 
objections are largely ineffective against hypothetico-deductivism. Douven (2005) argues 
that Lipton says too little about how and why Bayesians should build explanatory 
considerations into their framework. Furthermore, even if we concede that IBE better 
describes our inferential tendencies, we don‟t thereby achieve any normative justification 
for explanatory reasoning. What Lipton does say about the normativity of the rule is 
uninspiring.  
According to Lipton‟s matching claim, explanatory reasoning is justified since 
explanatory considerations direct us towards that hypothesis which is most precise, has 
greatest scope, and so on, which Lipton suggests render that hypothesis most probable. 
However, Lipton offers little by way of analysis for these theoretical virtues. 
Consequently, because they‟re notoriously vague, and because it‟s hard to justify why 
they matter for purposes of confirmation, and because we don‟t know how to balance 
these often competing qualities against one another, Lipton leaves many hostages to 
fortune. The justification for explanatory reasoning is entirely derivative, and it is 
derivative on something that‟s worryingly vague. There is no answer as to why we should 
value a rule that directs us towards the simplest hypothesis, other things being equal. 
However, we might reasonably expect that if a theory of confirmation is going to place a 
premium on considerations of simplicity, then it should justify that decision. Leaving so 
many concepts unanalyzed might leave us again wondering whether there‟s any real 
substance to IBE.  
The failure to more carefully define these concepts becomes problematic again when we 
turn to Lipton‟s guiding principle. It is suggested both that, as an empirical matter, we 
tend to be impressed by explanatory considerations and, when confronted with competing 
explanations, it is the simpler, more precise, and so on, that is inferred. However, there is 
no obvious reason to suppose that the sense of simplicity that I employ when making a 
judgment about competing explanations will be the same sense that might prove a 
justified means of adjudicating between competing hypotheses.
2
 A normative justification 
for Lipton‟s account requires either that we offer distinct analyses of explanatory and 
theoretical simplicity, then argue that explanatory simplicity is a reliable guide to 
theoretical simplicity, or we stipulate that simplicity has the same sense in each context. 
The former strategy is far from straightforward. The latter makes it much more difficult to 
argue that we in fact prefer simpler explanations, in the relevant sense and other things 
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 For example, in curve-fitting problems it has been argued that introducing additional 
adjustable parameters is appropriate only if will improve the predictive accuracy of the 
curve. If we define simplicity in terms of the number of adjustable parameters, then we 
justify a role for simplicity within certain well-defined contexts (see Forster and Sober 
(1994)). However, the balance between fit and number of parameters emerges from a 
non-obvious mathematical theorem. It seems unlikely that any „intuitive‟ sense of 
simplicity that we might employ in evaluating explanations should guide us towards 
hypotheses that are more simple in this respect. 
being equal. Maintaining both the guiding principle and a normatively justified 
interpretation of IBE becomes less plausible. 
Hopes of preserving the normative dimension of IBE are further degraded when Lipton 
appeals to data from cognitive psychology. For example, Lipton describes the results of 
work conducted by Kahneman and Tversky, which demonstrated our propensity for 
committing the conjunction fallacy. (Asked to identify which event was most probable, 
given some scenario, many subjects committed the error of supposing a conjunction of 
two events can be more probable than one of the conjuncts.) Lipton offers this as 
evidence both that we are not good at Bayesian updating and that explanatory 
considerations play an important role in how we reason. An obvious concern is that 
Lipton‟s interpretation of the result provides an immediate example of explanatory 
reasoning that is unreliable. Lipton responds that in circumstances more complicated than 
those described by Kahneman and Tversky explanatory reasoning might be more reliable, 
but offers no evidence to support the conjecture.  
In summary, Lipton argues that explanatory loveliness is both a reliable guide to 
explanatory likeliness, because considerations like simplicity and scope are features of 
more probable hypotheses and more virtuous explanations, and an important aspect of our 
inferential practices. However, the connections between these theoretical virtues and the 
plausibility of a given hypothesis are sufficiently vague that it is hard to admit them into a 
theory of confirmation as brute facts. The argument also requires us to concede that our 
natural proclivities, when evaluating explanations, will draw on similar considerations to 
those that will ultimately be deemed important for evaluating hypotheses, and that we 
apply them in similar ways. Finally, in light of our demonstrated cognitive failures where 
we are perhaps unduly influenced by explanatory considerations, we must hope for 
evidence that such failures are heavily restricted to certain kinds of case. Absent such 
evidence and, although we might have reason to suppose we in fact employ explanatory 
reasoning, we‟d lack any reason to suppose that we should. The normative dimension of 
IBE, as developed by Lipton, is both vague and tenuous. Admittedly Lipton at times 
seems content with defending a purely descriptive interpretation of IBE, in which we 
declare only that explanatory considerations in fact feature prominently in our reasoning. 
Typically IBE is understood as a normative thesis; a purely descriptive thesis certainly 
falls short of my ambitions for the rule. 
Where did Lipton go wrong? I suggest it‟s in arguing that explanatory and theoretical 
virtues align. By adopting that position it becomes hard for explanatory considerations to 
illuminate, account for, or justify judgments about which of competing hypotheses is 
most plausible. The promise of IBE, as initially presented by Lipton, was with the idea 
that we could read off qualities of an explanation and thereby learn something important 
about the merits of the underlying theory. Given the matching claim, any normative 
justification for IBE becomes fully dependent on concepts that are not only problematic 
and vague, but also appear independent of explanatory considerations. Consequently, 
Lipton is forced to adopt an essentially descriptive interpretation of the rule. A model of 
IBE would be more useful and more interesting if we could identify peculiarly 
explanatory virtues, that cannot be identified with qualities of the underlying hypotheses, 
and that help us understand why certain inferences are sensible. Developed in this way 
and IBE could live up to its reputation as a theory of how we should reason. Utilizing 
Woodward‟s model of causal explanation I‟ll now sketch a way of relating explanatory 
considerations to underlying plausibility that seems promising. 
3. Invariance, Mechanisms and Consilience  
Woodward‟s model is centrally concerned with change relating regularities, regularities 
that describe how changes in the value of one variable affect the value of another. 
Interventions on variables pick out causal and explanatory relations, for Woodward, if 
they are a reliable means of manipulating other variables within the regularity. Many 
regularities will satisfy this standard under some conditions but not others. For example, 
the ideal gas law properly captures our ability to increase the temperature of a gas by 
increasing the pressure, in certain circumstances. The law is thus a change-relating 
regularity that describes a causal relation, exploitable for purposes of explaining. The law 
doesn‟t hold universally, however. When temperatures become sufficiently low, or 
pressures sufficiently high, the law no longer accurately describes the relation between 
these variables. In such conditions we might appeal to the van der waals equation, which 
holds in circumstances where the ideal gas law breaks down. For Woodward, the latter is 
more invariant. Regularities are invariant if they continue to hold despite interventions on 
the variables that feature in that regularity. We explain an outcome by appealing to a 
system of regularities that is invariant under at least some interventions, and which can be 
combined with a range of possible initial and boundary conditions to describe how events 
would have differed had those conditions been otherwise. Only regularities that are 
invariant under some interventions are explanatory. Regularities that are more invariant 
support a broader range of explanations, since they allow us to say more about how things 
would have been different if initial or background conditions were different.  
Although Woodward isn‟t concerned with the relationship between invariance and 
confirmation, and even expresses some skepticism about inference to the best explanation 
(see note 5), I suspect there are important connections. My proposal is that it is reasonable 
to infer more invariant explanations, over less invariant explanations, because 
considerations of invariance tell us something important about the regularities that ground 
the explanations. My suggestion is that pursuing greater invariance will tend to produce 
the kinds of achievements that scientists consider epistemically significant, including our 
admiration for verified novel predictions, predictive success more generally, and high 
precision testing, our suspicion of ad hoc hypotheses, desire for both `deeper' 
explanations and explanations of `free parameters', as well as our pursuit of theories that 
have greater consilience. Despite their reputations, these concepts are poorly understood. 
The concept of invariance, insofar as it can illuminate these more familiar concepts, 
advances our understanding of confirmation.  
Before offering some details, a few preliminaries are in order. First, invariance is distinct 
from predictive success, consilience, scope, and so on. The proposal thus shares with 
Lipton‟s defense a distinction between two types of explanatory achievement. We can 
evaluate an explanation in terms of its invariance, where more invariant explanations are 
better. Explanatory hypotheses and regularities can also be better insofar as they are less 
ad hoc, more precise, verified by novel predictions, and so on. If invoking the concept of 
invariance offers more plausible analyses for the confirmatory significance of such 
considerations, then it has importance for our understanding of confirmation as well as 
explanation. What distinguishes my proposal from Lipton‟s more recent defense is that 
invariance is a peculiarly explanatory virtue, rather than a feature of the underlying theory 
or hypothesis. This creates room for a normative defense of explanatory reasoning. It is 
also important to distinguish a more modest from a more ambitious version of the thesis 
I‟m proposing. The more modest rests content with providing a better account for extant 
confirmatory considerations. The more ambitious version assumes, or argues, that those 
concepts are in turn indicative of more general forms of scientific achievement. If 
pursuing invariance helps us achieve deeper explanations, for example, and deeper 
explanations indicate a more truthlike theory, then we connect a distinctively explanatory 
virtue to perhaps the ultimate scientific achievement. Admittedly concepts like 
consilience and ad hoc-ness are only poorly understood, thus difficult concepts to offer in 
defense of realist commitments. However, insofar as IBE might help provide more 
convincing analyses for various intuitions surrounding questions of confirmation, once 
augmented with Woodward‟s concept of invariance, it can simultaneously help justify its 
own normative credentials. It‟s beyond the scope of this paper to start properly exploring 
the connections between invariance and all the concepts I‟ve alluded to. Hopefully a 
couple of examples will provide adequate motivation for the thesis. 
First, let‟s return to Lipton‟s desire for mechanistic explanations and Barnes‟ concern that 
merely adding a mechanism can‟t itself reliably improve an explanation. The concept of 
invariance enables us to distinguish mechanisms that improve our explanations from 
those that don‟t. Drawing on Woodward‟s example, the amount of pressure applied to the 
gas pedal explains the speed of my car, at least under some conditions. This change-
relating regularity can be exploited for purposes of manipulating the speed of the car, and 
therefore for purposes of explaining the speed, even for those of us who are ignorant 
about how changing the pressure applied to the pedal brings about the change in speed. 
Providing a mechanism that relates these variables will not always produce a better 
explanation: fanciful mechanisms that have no grounding in experience describe 
mechanisms. Mechanisms which are more invariant than the crude regularity we begin 
with increase our ability to manipulate and control the speed of the car under a wider 
range of conditions. We improve our understanding of the counterfactual dependencies 
that describe the system. Providing a mechanism that relates distinct variables will 
improve an explanation only if it is more invariant than the regularity alone.  
Providing mechanisms for causal regularities is an important scientific pursuit. 
Thoroughly speculative mechanisms, however, are not valued, requiring us to find means 
of distinguishing speculative from plausible mechanisms. The concept of invariance 
achieves that. Furthermore, it‟s at least plausible to suppose that this improved ability to 
manipulate a system reflects a better understanding for how a given system behaves.
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 Several authors have suggested that IBE has importance for purposes of fixing prior 
probabilities, likelihoods, or both, within Bayes‟ equation (for example, Lipton (2004), 
Okasha (2000), Weisberg (2009)). The rule is thus given a probabilistic interpretation. 
Elsewhere I‟ve argued that advocates for this approach are vulnerable to a critical 
As a second illustration, again inspired by Woodward (2003, 261-2), consider the puzzle 
of distinguishing consilience from conjunction. Conjoining two theories produces a new, 
more general theory. However, explaining events by appealing to a conjunction is no 
improvement over an explanation that appeals to the relevant conjunct. Conjoining 
Hooke‟s law with the ideal gas law doesn‟t improve our explanations for the temperature 
of a given gas, even though the conjunction is more general. Theories are, however, 
lauded for their consilience. Newton‟s theory of universal gravitation offered 
explanations for falling bodies, planetary motions and tidal effects via a unified system. 
Consilience involves more than just conjunction, but identifying the excess has proved 
problematic. Again the concept of invariance is edifying. Conjunctions provide no 
additional information about the effects of intervening on variables, beyond what‟s 
provided by one of the conjuncts in isolation. Frequently cited cases of consilience, in 
contrast, do provide additional information. Galileo offered explanations for bodies 
falling near the Earth‟s surface.  Newton also offered explanations for bodies falling near 
the surface of Earth (or any other massive object), but his were invariant under changes to 
the mass and radius of the body on which the objects are dropped. Newton‟s explanations 
are invariant in ways that Galileo‟s are not. The concept of invariance accounts for the 
differing attitudes towards conjunction and consilience.  
The concept of invariance promises valuable analyses of various confirmatory concepts. 
A convincing defense of this claim requires both a more careful explication of the two 
                                                                                                                                                                             
dilemma and that IBE should instead be understood as a guide to better representations of 
target systems (see author). 
concepts already presented, and their relation to invariance, and extended discussions of 
the other concepts I‟ve alluded to. A satisfactory treatment lies beyond the scope of this 
paper, but hopefully I‟ve done enough to at least induce some goodwill for the idea. 
Rather than develop this aspect of the project further, in the following section I‟ll explore 
an independent reason to regard Woodward‟s theory as a helpful crutch for IBE. 
4. Descriptions, Explanations and IBE’s Scope  
For Woodward, explaining involves communicating relations of counterfactual 
dependence. Regularities that don‟t capture such relations can‟t be utilized for purposes 
of explaining, although they might provide useful and accurate descriptions of target 
populations. For example, “All swans are white” cannot explain why a particular swan is 
white, since it doesn‟t provide the kind of dependency to which Woodward attaches 
significance. The explanatory impotence of certain regularities has an important 
consequence for Harman‟s puzzle, described above. Concerned to identify those 
circumstances when it is appropriate to infer „All A‟s are B‟s‟ given that „All observed 
A‟s are B‟s‟, Harman suggests the inference is justified if the former provides the best 
explanation for the latter. If the regularity is not change relating however, then it doesn‟t 
explain at all, at least according to Woodward.  
IBE is understood differently by different authors. One disagreement concerns the rule‟s 
scope. Harman (1965) and Psillos (2002) suggest the rule is more general than inductive 
reasoning; Lipton (2004) describes IBE instead as one important type of non-deductive 
reasoning. I favour Lipton‟s more modest attitude; some of the considerations that 
persuade me will be presented below. Adopting Lipton‟s position burdens one with 
providing criteria for when IBE can, and cannot, be employed, and an intriguing platform 
for that project is precisely the distinction between descriptions and explanations that 
Woodward‟s model of explanations articulates. Sometimes our concerns are principally 
with describing a process, or kind; sometimes our concerns lie with explaining why 
certain events occurred, or why things are configured in a particular way. Restricting 
explanatory inferences to those circumstances when we are actually engaged in 
explaining seems sensible. It also helps insulate the rule against important objections. 
Consider Hitchcock‟s (2007) objection, in which we imagine two coins, one fair and one 
biased (3:1) in favour of heads. A coin is selected at random and flipped four times, 
where each flip lands heads. We assume a prior probability of 1/2 that we selected a 
particular coin, conditionalize on the new evidence, and thereby determine the posterior 
probabilities. We know how probable it is that we selected either coin, but Hitchcock 
sensibly asks what reason IBE can offer for preferring one hypothesis over the other. 
Relative to the evidence, neither hypothesis is simpler, more unifying nor, more 
generally, more lovely. Thus while the Bayesian can give clear directives concerning 
which hypothesis is more probable, and by how much, advocates of IBE seemingly have 
little to offer. Hitchcock‟s concern is well-directed, but might serve to motivate the 
delineation described above. Whether the selected coin is fair, or not, is a question about 
whether we have properly described the propensity of the coin. Such descriptions will 
align more or less probably with the outcome of subsequent sequences of flips, which are 
thereby entirely relevant for purposes of evaluating the plausibility of the competing 
descriptions. By restricting IBE to the evaluation of change relating regularities, however, 
the example falls outside the domain of IBE. Hitchcock is thus quite correct, I‟d submit: 
IBE has nothing to offer in terms of illuminating such cases. The lesson is not that IBE is 
flawed, but that it has a restricted range of application.
4
 
5. Conclusions 
Inference to the best explanation faces various objections and would benefit from 
additional work along several dimensions. Most urgent, to my mind, is that the rule 
distinguish itself from a recommendation simply that we infer that conclusion which is 
most plausible given available evidence. A second significant challenge emerges from 
some very sensible criticisms: explanatory considerations are not always relevant to 
inductive reasoning, so the rule must have a more limited scope than some have 
suggested. The challenge is to identify those circumstances when IBE helpfully and 
properly models good inferential habits. In Woodward‟s account of causal explanation 
I‟ve suggested that we may have the resources both to develop a potentially instructive 
and plausible version of IBE, and simultaneously start to better understand its boundaries.  
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 Woodward (2003, 5) also expresses doubts about IBE, arguing that the distinction 
between explanation and description is essential to a proper understanding of scientific 
methodology, but that descriptions are evidently not confirmed by appeals to explanatory 
qualities. Clearly, however, once we rescind hopes of developing IBE into a universal 
model of confirmation, Woodward‟s concern disappears.  
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